In this article we review work on mental imagery in adults and children. We argue that the fundamental issue of how we respond to a stimulus to create a descriptive, propositional scene description, and then render this description into an image is poorly understood. In addition to providing a new framework by which to address this issue, we highlight several other topics within the study of mental imagery that require further investigation. These include inhibiting irrelevant information and making inferences, knowing the difference between reality and imagination (or even beliefs and imagination), and point of view. We conclude by suggesting future directions of study to address these additional topics.
INTRODUCTION
Imagination is a crucial part of human cognition and is involved in such diverse abilities as planning, problem solving, hypothetical and counterfactual thinking, theory of mind, and mental time travel. Imagination can be defined as the process by which the mind "decides" what needs to be in an image, the steps involved in generating the "output," or the actual visual mental image. Although there has been a good deal of work on what adults "do" with mental images (e.g., mental rotation), less attention has been paid to how we actually create the visual image. The aim of this article is thus to encourage a broader conception of imagination, and the place that visual mental imagery holds in it.
Because visual mental imagery is the most studied aspect of imagination, we will focus the first section of this article on reviewing some key findings on visual mental imagery in adults and children. Despite the fact that research in these two populations has addressed a number of interesting issues, and has done so using different approaches, the fundamental question of how a visual mental image is created remains unknown. We tackle this issue in Section 2 by providing a process-based framework for how images are created. In Section 3, we conclude by providing thoughts about how this framework could be tested, along with additional issues in the study of visual mental imagery that have remained unexplored.
VISUAL MENTAL IMAGERY IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN
Visual mental imagery has been studied in adults and children, but the questions asked and the empirical approaches differ in important ways. The research in adults has focused on what they do with these images, but not on the fundamental issue of how these images are created. For example, there is research exploring whether mental images exist at all, the properties of mental images (D'Angiulli & Reeves, 2007; Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978) , transformations of mental images such as rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971) , and the effects of mental imagery on sport performance (Kosslyn & Moulton, 2009) , depression, and optimism (Klein & Zajac, 2009) .
Developmental research has focused on whether children can distinguish mental images from reality, and whether they can manipulate these images. For example, in a study by Wellman and Estes (1986) , children listened to stories about characters who were either thinking about a cookie, for example, pretending that they had a cookie, or actually possessed a cookie. Even 3-year-olds had a reasonably good understanding that, unlike the character who actually possessed the cookie, the character who was just thinking about the cookie would not be able to see, touch, or act upon it. Moreover, when children are asked why they cannot touch or act upon a thought-about object, they provide surprisingly coherent answers. In response to the question of why she cannot touch a mental image, Estes (1994) describes a 5-year-old who states "How could you reach inside your head? Besides, it's not even there." (p. 538), and a 3-year-old who responds to the question of whether the interviewer can see the picture in her head with "No, people can't see my 'magination'" (p. 538) .
Estes argues that these explanations suggest that preschoolers have both a conceptual understanding about the characteristics of mental images and "direct introspective access" to these images. In another study, Estes and colleagues (Estes, Wellman, & Woolley, 1989) reported that 3-year-olds could comment upon and manipulate their mental images (e.g., make a balloon stretch or scissors cut). Moreover, when asked to imagine these sorts of transformations, the mental effort that children exert is reflected by their ". . . squinting, grimacing, and head tilting" (Estes, 1994, p. 539) . These data thus provide evidence that young children can engage in visual mental imagery.
In addition to forming and transforming images in their minds, young children, like adults, show some competence at mentally rotating these images (e.g., Estes, 1998; Marmor, 1975) , though accuracy improves with age (Childs & Polich, 1979; Dean & Scherzer, 1982; Kail, Pellegrino, & Carter, 1980) . Mental rotation in adults is assessed by asking participants to determine whether two stimuli that differ in orientation are identical or mirror-image reversals (e.g., Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) . Results from such studies demonstrate that the time taken to mentally rotate the stimulus shows a linear increase with the amount of rotation required to reorient the object. Moreover, most adults refer to the process of mental rotation when explaining their performance on this task. What is important for our purposes is that there is evidence of this linear increase in children as young as 5 years of age (e.g., Estes, 1998; Marmor, 1975) . Given the findings discussed thus far, we would argue that children create visual images, manipulate these images, and have an understanding of how these images differ from reality. As with the research with adults, however, the issue of how children actually create a mental image is not known.
Having briefly discussed how the study of visual mental imagery has been approached in adults and children, we now turn to a framework that considers imagination more broadly, including, most notably, the processes involved in creating a visual mental image. It is this fundamental issue that we argue has yet to be explored in the study of imagination.
A FRAMEWORK FOR IMAGINATION AND MENTAL IMAGERY
The term "imagination" tends to be used in three different ways:
1. as synonymous with creativity; 2. the process of generating a mental image; or 3. the generation or design of an (imagined) entity (e.g., an invention, or a hypothetical situation).
In this framework, we use the term "imagination" to describe the creation of belief-like entities in the mind (definition 3). This process might or might not include the generation of a "mental image" (definition 2). These sensation-or belief-like entities might be purely semantic and propositional, as when we imagine hypothetical situations such as "everyone is cheerful." Because "cheerfulness" is not necessarily accompanied by a sensory element (e.g., a cheerful person need not appear cheerful), we can "imagine" cheerfulness without creating a vivid mental image. Goldman (2006) refers to this process as "supposition imagination," or "S-imagination." Thus, S-imagination might contain proposition-like representations that have no sensory component (e.g., "Francesca owns this land" or "x = 4") or they could represent visual or spatial information (e.g., "the cat is on the sofa"). Because these proposition-like entities describe a scene, Kosslyn (1994) refers to them as "descriptive" representations, and so will we. Imagination is a process involving two main stages. The first is the process that determines what things should be imagined, and the second involves creating a mental image of those things.
Creating a Scene Description
The first step in the visual imagination process is creating the descriptive representation. We will call the product of this process a "scene description." To describe what each step entails, we will use the following example throughout this section: suppose a person is called upon to imagine going to a particular restaurant in a wheelchair. Let us also suppose that this person, in real life, does not use a wheelchair, and that the restaurant is one with which she is familiar. Imagining this scene requires accessing both episodic and semantic memories. For example, she will need to recall memories of the layout of the restaurant and might also recall specific past episodes of having been there. Although these memories contain a great deal of visual and spatial information, they are stored as descriptive representations. They are structured descriptions, or sentence-like structures, consisting of symbols. Although the exact code in which these entities are represented is unknown, as are the exact symbols used, we will assume, as others do, that they look something like this:
This descriptive representation describes a brown restaurant with eight steps in front of it, forming a staircase.
Both sides of the so-called "imagery debate" agree that our memories, even visuospatial memories, are represented descriptively. Pylyshyn (1978) eloquently describes excellent reasons to believe this. For example, we can recall visual scenes based on words. When our fictitious person is asked to imagine the restaurant, the fact that mentioning the restaurant in words allows her to retrieve memories of that restaurant indicates that the memories are not (entirely) depictive but, rather, symbolic structures. Although our memories of scenes are descriptive, the theory of mental imagery holds that depictive representations can be created on demand. Whether or not people can do this is the essence of the imagery debate. For the purposes of this article, we will assume that mental images exist.
We now return to the creation of the descriptive representation. Previously we described how a person might recall specific facts about a restaurant and bring these facts to bear on a new scene description (perhaps in working memory). However, all imagining is generative to some degree. For example, she might recall the wrong memories-actual memories of a different place. She might imagine this restaurant's windows as having blinds, thus confusing memories of the restaurant with memories from another, similar restaurant. People can also generate descriptions that are entirely confabulated. This effect is common and documented in the false memory literature (e.g., Loftus, 1979 Loftus, /1996 .
Not only will an imagined scene description contain some combination of legitimate memories, misattributed memories, and false memories, but the imaginer will, often deliberately, "flesh out" the imagined scene description with propositions that are acknowledged as hypothetical. In our running example, if the restaurant, in reality, does not have a ramp, our imaginer might suppose that the restaurant had a ramp. The effect is even more extreme if a person is asked to imagine something fantastical, such as "a birthday party underwater" or some other scene that has never been experienced.
There are several sub-problems encountered at this point: (a) How is a stimulus used as a query into memory?; (b) Which memories are retrieved?; (c) Which memories are ignored?; and (d) How does the mind flesh out the description with other propositions? We know from the memory literature that memory queries work with some sort of semantic priming, probably through spreading activation. If we are to imagine a ramp, we are likely to bring a railing to mind as well. In terms of fleshing out the description, the only data we have are from the false memory literature. When false memories are induced through suggestion, some people will flesh out the scene with facts gathered from world knowledge and other personal experiences. For example, Loftus and Pickrell (1995) suggested to experimental participants that when they were children they were lost in a mall. Some participants created embellishments that were not in the original suggestion. However, the details of how descriptive representations are created are still very much unknown. What symbols are used? How does the imaginer decide that the description is sufficiently fleshed out and stop adding descriptions? How are memories combined to generate novel scenes?
Creating the Visual Mental Image
Although the creation of descriptive representations does not require the generation of mental images, the spatial and visual aspects of the descriptive representation can be transformed into mental imagery of various modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile), but need not be. An interesting question arises: if the descriptive representation is not a mental image, then what is? According to Kosslyn (1994) , visual 1 mental imagery representations only contain information about points of color and their locations. In computer graphics such a representation is known as a "bitmap." In other words, the mind creates "pixels" of color at various areas. This "depictive" representation, also called enactment (E-imagination, according to Goldman, 2006) , or sensory imagination, is unstructured and is uninterpreted (e.g., surface or object identification). As opposed to descriptive representations, which have meaningful symbols, to infer the existence of an object in a depictive representation requires perceptual processing. How these visual mental images are actually created is unknown, and as of yet unexplored.
When light plays on the eyes, the early visual systems send information to the visual cortex. Although there is some interpretation in early vision, there is reason to believe that there is a pattern of increased neuronal firing in the visual cortex that is spatially organized as it was on the retina. This is true in monkeys (Tootell, Silverman, Switkes, & Valois, 1982) and humans (Miyawaki, Uchida, Yamashita, Sato, Morito, Tanabe, et al., 2008) . There is an analogous area of the human brain that is particularly active during mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1994) . We infer from these findings that when human beings engage in visual imagination, there is a retinotopic, "depictive" representation of the imagined scene encoded in the firing activity in the visual cortex.
Our restaurant imaginer does not stop with a fleshed-out scene description. If she imagines the scene vividly, the descriptive representations must be translated into this depiction. As opposed to the descriptive representation example presented above, a depictive representation provides information that consists only of colors at particular locations. This is the only explicit information. For example, the following is a simple depictive representation of a square, where 1s indicate "black" and 0s indicate "white": 000000000 011111110 010000010 010000010 010000010 010000010 010000010 011111110 000000000
Note that there is no symbol for "square" anywhere in the depiction. In order to know that there is a square implicitly represented in the image, perceptual processes must be applied to it. For reasons described above, we assume that when human beings engage in visual imagination, there is a retinotopic, depictive representation of the imagined scene encoded in the firing activity in the visual cortex. This happens, presumably, so that the imagined scene can be re-interpreted by perceptual processes. Though re-interpretation is the major functional reason offered for mental imagery, empirical support for peoples' ability to do it at all has been spotty (see Chambers & Reisberg, 1985, and Slezak, 1992 , for some failed attempts, and Finke, Pinker, & Farah, 1989 , for a response).
The bitmap-like representation is the "depictive" representation. In computer graphics, this is referred to as "rendering." In graphics, rendering is taking a description of a scene (which objects are present, where they are, what light sources are present, etc.) and producing an image that people can see on a computer screen (Pharr, 2004) . In graphics, however, it is much simpler than in human beings, because there are fewer "decisions" for the renderer to make, and most of these decisions are based on physics (e.g., how light reflects off of metal). In humans, there is substantial processing that occurs to render the final image in visual cortex. Suppose, for example, that the person wants to imagine the ramp for the wheelchair. The person has, represented in her scene description, the following ideas: The ramp is made of wood. It has a guardrail on the left side. It is to the right of the stairs. It is made of wood. It is of moderate steepness. Even with this level of detail, there are numerous other decisions to be made when rendering it in neurons as a bitmap. Exactly how steep is a "moderate steepness?" 2 How many wood slats will there be in the ramp? What color is the wood? What is the lighting? How do the shadows play on the ramp? Is it daytime or nighttime? This "rendering" that people must do is a major cognitive task that has received little attention.
The above framework shows the complexity of the full process of imagination. There are many unsolved problems that this framework introduces; we will describe a few of them below, and suggest how they might be solved.
UNEXPLORED TERRITORY AND FUTURE WORK

Creation of the Descriptive Representation
One account of how descriptive representations are created is that we imagine things the way we experience them. For example, if one imagines a restaurant, one could bring to mind a specific one, or generate the idea of a new one based on multiple previous experiences. It could be, for example, that people know to put pictures on walls (rather than, for example, on floors) simply because they
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appear on walls more often than on floors in their perceptual experience. Since cats are indoor animals in the United States and Canada, we would expect that people's imaginings of cats would be in interior rather than exterior settings.
This idea could be tested by having both child and adult participants describe the objects in an imagined scene. This would result in an object co-occurrence matrix (i.e., how often does each object co-occur with each other). If participants are using perceptual experience of the world to generate objects in their imaginings, then this matrix should be similar to matrices generated from tagged photographs. If the theory is correct, then, for example, if heads tend to appear in photographs with hats, then heads should also appear, with the same probability, with hats in people's imaginings. Although there would be no reason to expect qualitative differences in performance between child and adult participants, quantitative differences would be likely-for example, whereas adults might state "heads," "eyes," "hair," etc., children may provide less information over all reflecting a smaller knowledge base than adults.
Transforming Descriptions into Depictions
There is no research, to our knowledge, of how scene descriptions are actually transformed into visual mental images. Indeed, even the well-studied rotation task (i.e., asking individuals to mentally rotate an image) does not answer this fundamental question. For example: are the transformations fundamentally in the mental image (the depictive representation is transformed in the visual cortex, without, necessarily, a corresponding change in the descriptive representation that generated it), or are they reflections of changes in the underlying scene description that are reflected in the mental image?
However, it could also be that the act of mental rotation is first performed on the descriptive representation, and "snapshots" are rendered on the fly, thus generating the depictive representation. To our knowledge, there is no evidence either way. An experiment could be run to find out. If scene descriptions are stored in working memory, then both child and adult participants should suffer from interference when attempting to do mental rotation tasks under working memory load. If mental rotation requires only the image, then there should be less interference. If rotation reflects frequent updating from working memory, the interference should be great. Again, we would not expect qualitative differences in performance between adult and child participants, but due to the development in working memory occurring during the preschool years (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001) , it is possible that this age group might show relatively more interference than adults.
Inhibiting Irrelevant Information and Making Inferences
Returning to the "wheelchair" example described earlier, any imaginer will have many memories that are irrelevant to the task at hand. One bit of complex cognition is deciding which descriptions to work with, and which to safely ignore. For example, the kind of mirror in the women's restroom is not relevant to getting into the restaurant with a wheelchair. Whereas adults seem to effortlessly ignore this type of irrelevant information (though we don't know how), an interesting question is whether children can also do so. Because children's executive functioning (and, inhibitory control, more specifically) undergoes rapid development during the preschool years (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001) , it is possible that younger preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) might include more irrelevant information in their "imaginings" than would older children and adults. Alternatively, children of this age might include less information because their knowledge bases are smaller than those of older children and adults. Either way, these alternatives would suggest an important difference between the imaginings of young children and adults and would address the question of how the actual process of creating a visual image unfolds.
Another important part of the process of imagination is that there are often many relevant facts that are inaccessible, or were never even encoded. If, for example, the main entrance to the restaurant has stairs, and the imaginer always uses them, there might have been no call for her to notice whether there was a wheelchair-accessible entrance. In this case, the person might try to flesh out the description with default knowledge of restaurants (perhaps using prototypes). Perhaps the person would remember that the restaurant is located in a city that has laws requiring wheelchair access. The person could then add the existence of a ramp to the scene being created in working memory. This is a kind of inference, rather than a memory recall. This highlights another complex aspect of imagination: how general knowledge is used in the fleshing out of scenes with information not remembered from a specific episode. Again, this process would be interesting to explore from a developmental perspective. In this case, because even very young children are developing "semantic" or "script-based" knowledge about the world (e.g., Hudson & Nelson, 1986) , it is possible that, like adults, they could draw on this knowledge to enrich their imagination.
Knowing the Difference between Imagination and Reality
An intriguing cognitive problem that is not always appreciated in the psychological literature is that although these generated representations are assumed to be in the same "code" as real beliefs about the world, we do not tend to mistake them for real beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the actual world). For example, if we imagine being able to fly, we will create belief-like representations encoding as much, and we can reason with them in the context of the imagining. But we do not believe in that representation in the same way we believe we can walk. We do not, for example, jump off of buildings, simply because we imagined that we could. This problem of how the mind keeps imagined beliefs from "contaminating" real beliefs has been addressed in the philosophical literature (see Nichols, 2006 , for a review). Though we don't know exactly how adults know the difference between their imaginings and their beliefs, it is clear that they do.
On the other hand, young children likely have more difficulty with this distinction. This is because they have substantial difficulty identifying the sources of their knowledge (e.g., O'Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 1992; O'Neill & Chong, 2001; O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991) . For example, if a 3-year-old learns through his sense of smell that a clear-looking liquid is strawberry perfume, he will later be confused about whether he learned this fact by smelling the liquid, looking at the liquid, or being told this particular fact. More anecdotally, examples of little boys jumping off counters because they think they can fly like Superman also suggest that keeping one's (true) beliefs and imaginations separate is sometimes challenging! More generally, are there disorders that interfere with people's abilities to distinguish imagination from reality? Is this what is happening during hallucinations? Why do we believe in our imaginations while we're dreaming, even though some dreams are patently unrealistic? Nichols (2004) suggests that (for adults, we assume) imagined "facts" are stored in a "pretence box" so that they do not contaminate "real" beliefs. It is hard, however to think of how this idea could be put to empirical test.
Imagining Oneself in a Future Event
Turning now to children, specifically, the research we reviewed earlier highlights some important achievements in mental imagery during early childhood. However, there are some fundamental questions about these processes that have not been addressed. First, do children imagine themselves in future events in a similar way in which adults tend to do so? For example, if one thinks about preparing dinner this evening, one can visualize oneself in the kitchen chopping vegetables on the island, walking to the cupboard to retrieve a frying pan, and then walking to the stove top to cook these vegetables. Moreover, if asked to visualize the full three steps (i.e., "chopping," "retrieving," "cooking"), this process should take longer than simply visualizing steps 2 and 3, although we know of no direct evidence of this. To what extent is this also true for young children? The answer to this question would not only provide a richer picture of children's visual imagery skills, but would also shed light on an interesting and emerging area of study in children's cognitive development-namely, their future thinking abilities.
The last 5 years has seen a dramatic increase in research on mental time travel (also known as "chronosthesia," of which "episodic foresight" is a crucial aspect) in both children and adults (Szupnar & McDermott, 2009 ). For example, in the realm of neuroscience, neuroimaging techniques have been used to demonstrate striking links between individuals' capacity to mentally reconstruct their pasts and forecast their futures (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Okuda, Fujii, Ohtake, Tsukiura, Tanji, Suzuki, et al., 2003) . In the developmental realm, researchers have begun to explore such topics as children's talk about the future, their ability to anticipate future states of the self, and their ability to act/behave with the future in mind. Most developmental studies indicate that children's capacity for these different aspects of episodic foresight is significantly improving between ages 3 and 5 (e.g., Atance & Jackson, 2009; Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011 ). Yet, little is known about what form this thought might take. As we alluded to earlier, when most adults are mentally projecting themselves into a future event, the simulations that they create are vivid and rich. As such, we might expect that younger preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds), who have difficulty with episodic foresight would not take longer to visualize a 3-versus a 2-step sequence like the one described above because they cannot realistically project themselves into the situation in question. In contrast, we might expect older children and adults to do so. Based on the research reviewed earlier, it would not be the case that the younger children could not actually visualize a kitchen or a stovetop, for example, but, rather, would have difficulty with the dynamic and temporal components of this task.
Point of View
One final (and, to our knowledge, unexplored) area of study that we wish to touch upon is the development of point of view in imagination. When a person imagines herself engaging in an activity, the point of view could be what is called "first person" in the film world. In first person imagination, the imagined scenes reflect what the imaginer believes she would actually experience were she in the situation herself. For example, if she imagined unlocking a door, she might imagine her arm extending out from the bottom right of her imagined visual field.
In contrast, an imaginer might create a "third person" imagining, which is more like how the activity would appear to an outside observer. Adults have the ability to deliberately imagine activities from both points of view (Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009 ), but we do not know when children develop this ability. One could explore this by asking children of different ages to imagine doing a particular activity, and then conducting measures to test the nature of the imagined scene. One such approach might be to show them images side-by-side and ask which image more closely resembled what they imagined. The two images (or videos) could represent prototypical examples of those activities from the two different points of view. In this case, one would need to control for "familiarity" effects-that is, presumably adults and children alike are most familiar with the "first-person" perspective since this is what they see on a daily basis.
Psychologists have shown that different points of view elicit different interpretations of the imagined activity. First person imaginings facilitate focus on sensory attributes. For example, in the case of imagining unlocking a door, a participant might describe the feel of the key on her fingers. Third person imaginings tend to bring to mind more abstract, evaluative aspects of the imagined scene, such as, in our example, the idea of trying to get into a house (Libby et al., 2009 ). If it is found that children can first use third person imagination, it would lead to the surprising hypothesis that children are cognizant of evaluative aspects of what they imagine in a way more primary than the sensory aspects.
CONCLUSION
There is far more to imagination than the transformation of mental images. In this article we described a framework for understanding imagination, from stimulus to mental imagery, that we hope will inspire further exploration. The entire process-from the creation of the scene description, how mental images are kept separate from other beliefs, and how decisions are made for the final image-are poorly understood in humans. We are even more in the dark about how these processes develop. Nonetheless, our hope is that this article has shed light on important problems in this area of study, as well as described promising possibilities for their inquiry.
